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a b s t r a c t
Decoding the contents of consciousness from brain activity is one of the most challenging frontiers of cognitive
neuroscience. The ability to interpret mental content without recourse to behavior is most relevant for understanding patients who may be demonstrably conscious, but entirely unable to speak or move willfully in any
way, precluding any systematic investigation of their conscious experience. The lack of consistent behavioral
responsivity engenders unique challenges to decoding any conscious experiences these patients may have solely
based on their brain activity. For this reason, paradigms that have been successful in healthy individuals cannot
serve to interpret conscious mental states in this patient group. Until recently, patient studies have used structured instructions to elicit willful modulation of brain activity according to command, in order to decode the presence of willful brain-based responses in this patient group. In recent work, we have used naturalistic paradigms,
such as watching a movie or listening to an audio-story, to demonstrate that a common neural code supports
conscious experiences in different individuals. Moreover, we have demonstrated that this code can be used to interpret the conscious experiences of a patient who had remained non-responsive for several years. This approach
is easy to administer, brief, and does not require compliance with task instructions. Rather, it engages attention
naturally through meaningful stimuli that are similar to the real-world sensory information in a patient's environment. Therefore, it may be particularly suited to probing consciousness and revealing residual brain function
in highly impaired, acute, patients in a comatose state, thus helping to improve diagnostication and prognostication for this vulnerable patient group from the critical early stages of severe brain-injury.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Introduction
Decoding the contents of consciousness from brain activity is one of
the most challenging frontiers of cognitive neuroscience. Progress has
been made in previous studies of healthy individuals. One common
type of paradigm uses sensory (e.g., visual or auditory) stimulation to
probe the neural code underlying conscious perceptual experiences. For
example, Nishimoto et al. (2011) acquired fMRI data as healthy individuals viewed a movie and developed an encoding model for the mechanisms of dynamic visual representation in visual cortex. Another type of
paradigm relies on measurement of external behavioral indexes for tagging the temporal evolution of brain activity, and interpreting whether
it codes for perception, intention, or action. For example, Soon et al.
(2008) used a button-press response to mark the time-point preceding
the participants' conscious intention to act. The authors demonstrated
that brain activity at that time-point predicted subsequent decisions,
even though participants were not conscious of any future action.
Yet, arguably, the ability to interpret mental content without
recourse to behavior is most relevant for understanding patients who
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lnaci@uwo.ca (L. Naci).

may be demonstrably conscious, but entirely unable to speak or move
willfully in any way, precluding any systematic investigation of their
conscious experience (Plum and Posner, 1966). Indeed, in most cases,
it is impossible to know whether these patients are conscious or not.
Upon failing to respond to commands in repeated clinical examinations,
behaviorally non-responsive patients are deemed unaware of themselves or the environment, and diagnosed as vegetative state (VS)
(The Multi-Society Task Force, 1994). In cases where patients show inconsistent but reproducible signs of awareness, they are diagnosed as
minimally conscious state (Giacino et al., 2002). The clinical assessment
of these patients' inconsistent behaviors, which are often limited by
motor constraints (Owen and Coleman, 2008), is difﬁcult and results
in high misdiagnosis rates (~ 43%) (Schnakers et al., 2009; Andrews
et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993). In the following sections, we review approaches to decoding conscious thought from brain activity, honing in
to paradigms that can be used to detect and interpret conscious experiences without recourse to behavior in this patient group. We revisit the
ﬁndings of Naci et al. (2014) and show some novel experimental results
that extend the previous ﬁndings.
The lack of consistent behavioral responsivity engenders unique
challenges to decoding any conscious experiences that non-responsive
patients may have solely based on their brain activity. For this reason,
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the aforementioned paradigms that have been successful in healthy
individuals cannot serve to interpret conscious mental states in this patient group. In particular, in the absence of behavior, brain activity alone
must serve as a marker of conscious awareness and, thus, it is necessary
to strictly rule out that the activity in question is due to any other factors, such as exogenously-driven processes. Therefore, paradigms that
probe brain activity in sensory cortex (e.g., as in Nishimoto et al.,
2011), which reﬂects (at least in part) exogenous, stimulus-driven
brain responses, cannot provide markers of conscious awareness for
non-responsive patients. Moreover, in the absence of any behavioral
manifestations of conscious states, paradigms that rely on behavioral
indexes (e.g., Soon et al., 2008) cannot interpret the relation of brain activity to external events. Instead, independent means for the interpretation of brain activity in these patients are necessary.
Patient studies to date have made signiﬁcant strides towards
decoding the brain activity of non-responsive patients. The majority of
studies have used structured instructions, such as “imagine playing
tennis”, “imagine navigating around your house”, or “attend to the
word ‘yes’/‘no’”, to distinguish between stimulus- and endogenouslydriven brain activity (Naci and Owen, 2013; Chennu et al., 2013;
Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013; Cruse et al., 2012; Bardin et al.,
2012; Cruse et al., 2011; Bardin et al., 2011; Monti et al., 2010; Owen
et al., 2006). When tested with these paradigms, a number of entirely
behaviorally non-responsive patients have demonstrated willful modulation of brain activity according to task instruction, thus demonstrating
their conscious awareness. Therefore, studies to date have established
that brain activity can be used as a proxy for behavior, and that a significant minority of non-responsive patients are demonstrably aware, despite the lack of behavioral response (Cruse et al., 2011; Monti et al.,
2010). However, the extent of preserved mental life in these patients,
especially with respect to whether they experience the world similarly
to healthy individuals, remains unknown.

Decoding executive function common to different individuals
To address this question, we recently asked (Naci et al., 2014)
whether there is a common neural code that can account for how different individuals might form similar conscious experiences, and, if so,
whether it could be used to interpret those experiences without
recourse to behavior. Initially, we quantiﬁed the neural correlates of
conscious experience common to different individuals using fMRI and
behavioral investigations, and then applied the same approach in
behaviorally non-responsive patients with unknown levels of consciousness, to examine and quantify their experience of the world in
the absence of self-report.
In particular, we used executive function as an empirical window for
quantifying human conscious experience. As an endogenously driven
meta-cognitive process that is integral to our conscious experience of
the world, executive function can serve as a marker of conscious awareness in non-responsive patients. Prior to this work, laboratory tests of
executive function had not been related to the open-ended nature
of conscious experiences. To solve this problem, we used a naturalistic
paradigm and investigated executive function during movie viewing.
By their very nature, engaging movies are designed to give viewers a
shared conscious experience driven, in part, by the recruitment of similar executive processes, as each viewer continuously integrates their
observations, analyses and predictions, while ﬁltering out any distractions, leading to an ongoing involvement in the movie's plot. Previous
work with healthy participants had shown that, when different individuals watch the same movie, correlated changes of brain activity across
them are observed (Hasson et al., 2010, 2008, 2004; Bartels and Zeki,
2004; Bartels and Zeki, 2005; Bartels et al., 2008). However, it remained
unknown whether any of these correlated activity ﬂuctuations reﬂect
similar executive function across different individuals in response to
the evolving executive demands of the movie plot.

Similarly to these previous studies (Hasson et al., 2010, 2004; Bartels
and Zeki, 2004; Bartels and Zeki, 2005; Bartels et al., 2008), we found
that when healthy participants viewed a highly engaging short movie
by Alfred Hitchcock – the so-called ‘Master of Suspense’– in the fMRI
scanner, they displayed highly correlated activity across the brain
(Figs. 1A–D), including supramodal frontal and parietal regions, which
support executive function (Barbey et al., 2012; Ptak, 2011; Duncan,
2010; Hampshire and Owen, 2006; Sauseng et al., 2005).
To investigate directly how the executive demands of the movie
drove the fronto-parietal activity, we assessed the movie's executive
load in two independent behavioral experiments. First, the extent to
which the movie made demands on executive functioning was quantiﬁed with a ‘dual-task’ procedure that has been used previously to investigate executive performance, both in patients with frontal lobe damage
(Pettit et al., 2013; Baddeley et al., 1996; Vikki et al., 1996) and in healthy
volunteers (Mizuno et al., 2012; Collette et al., 2005; D'Esposito et al.,
1995). This framework assumes that, because executive function is a ﬁnite resource, in moments when the load on one executively demanding
task (i.e., the movie) is greatest, the performance of a second executively
demanding task will be impaired, yielding a direct, quantitative, measure
of the executive demands of the ﬁrst task across time.
Adopting this framework, we used a dual-task for determining
the executive demands of the movie in a behavioral experiment, independently of the fMRI data, and subsequently, mapped them onto
brain activity via statistical parametric modeling. The dual-task
consisted of simultaneous performance of the Sustained Attention to
Response Task (SART) – which measures sustained attention and quantiﬁes executive function (Robertson et al., 1997) – and movie viewing.
SART was an optimal choice of an executively demanding task that
could be performed while simultaneously watching the movie. It
operates on the principle that insufﬁcient attention to a task can result
in slips of action, as automatic, unintended action sequences are triggered inappropriately. These automatic actions result in performance
errors that can be detected in the SART reaction times. Speciﬁcally, in
the SART, participants are required to respond with a button press to a
series of randomly presented (‘go’) digits, but withhold responses to
one pre-speciﬁed (‘no go’) digit. A signature of the SART is that a shortening of reaction times indicates a decrement in executive control, or,
conversely, an increment in response automaticity (Whyte et al.,
2006; Manly et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 1997). In particular, a shortening reaction time predicts an increased likelihood of a subsequent incorrect response to a ‘no go’ digit, and correlates with electrophysiological
measures of waning attention (Datta et al., 2007).
A group of healthy participants (N = 27) simultaneously watched
the movie and performed an auditory version of the SART. At the end
of the dual-task, participants answered 14 multiple-choice questions,
by selecting one of four answer options. These assessed each
participant's encoding of basic facts about the movie, and therefore, indirectly, their overall attention to the movie throughout its duration, as
they simultaneously performed the SART. Group-averaged SART performance followed the canonical pattern. Reaction times in trials immediately preceding an incorrect button-press response (i.e., to a ‘no go’
trial) were signiﬁcantly shorter than those immediately preceding correctly withheld responses (t(18) = 4.37; p b 0.0005), suggesting that
errors were due to lapses of attention (failure to inhibit a response to
a ‘no go’ trial). As the dual-task paradigm employed in the study measured interference between fundamentally similar cognitive processes,
within the constraints of our dual-task, these errors are caused by competing executive demands that arise during movie viewing. Only such
high-level cognitive processes could interfere with the mental processes
recruited by SART, or conversely, by the very deﬁnition of the dual-task
paradigm, any lower-level processes cannot cause interference, or performance decrements in the SART. Hence, the continual assessment of
SART performance ﬂuctuation while participants simultaneously
viewed the movie did indeed yield a direct, continuous measure of the
movie's executive load.
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Fig. 1. Brain-wide inter-subject correlation of neural activity during the intact and scrambled movie viewing. (A) Movie viewing elicited signiﬁcant (p b 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject
correlation across the brain. (B) No inter-subject correlation was observed in the resting state. (C) The scrambled movie elicited signiﬁcant (p b 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject correlation
only within primary and association visual and auditory cortices; none was observed in higher-order, supramodal cortex. (D) The intact movie elicited signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor)
more inter-subject correlation than the scrambled movie bilaterally, in parietal, temporal, motor, and dorsal/ventral frontal/prefrontal cortices. Warmer colors depict higher t-values of
inter-subject correlation.
Taken from Naci et al. (2014).

In order to correctly map the dual-task behavioral performance on
the fMRI data, only reaction times from subjects who successfully performed both tasks simultaneously were included. A the single-subject
level, 15/27 participants showed both a SART effect (p b 0.05) and
over 70% accuracy in the post movie questionnaire, and were deemed
to have correctly performed both components of the dual-task. The
group-averaged SART RTs from these subjects were included in the
fMRI analysis. SART reaction times signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) predicted activity in a brain network involving frontal and parietal regions
in the independent group of participants, who had watched the movie
without a secondary task in the fMRI scanner (Fig. 2B). This result
conﬁrmed that correlated activity in these regions was driven by the executive load of the movie, as indexed by an entirely independent behavioral measure acquired in a separate group of healthy participants.
Second, to conﬁrm that these modulations in frontal and parietal activities reﬂected a common conscious experience across individuals, we
developed a qualitative measure of the subjective experience of viewing
the movie that reﬂected, albeit indirectly, its ongoing executive load. In
a second behavioral experiment, a different group of participants (N =

15) watched the movie, and rated how ‘suspenseful’ it was every 2 s
from ‘least’ to ‘most suspenseful’ (Fig. 2C). Suspense ratings were highly
similar [t(14) = 25.3; p b 0.0001] across different participants
conﬁrming their common experience. Moreover, the group-averaged
suspense ratings signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) predicted activity in
a similar fronto-parietal network in the independent group who had
watched the movie in the fMRI scanner, with frames rated as ‘highly
suspenseful’ predicting stronger activity in this network (Fig. 2D). This
ﬁnding was consistent with a previous electroencephalography (EEG)
study showing that inter-subject correlation of the EEG signal predicted
the subjective experience of individuals watching audio-visual television content (Dmochowski et al., 2014).
In classic Hitchcock movies, such as the one used in this study,
suspense arises through understanding the plots' twists and turns,
which are highlighted by the dramatic music soundtrack. To further
test whether the perception of suspense indeed depended on
comprehending the narrative, or whether it could be elicited on the
basis of the soundtrack alone without any comprehension of the
movie's plot we acquired fMRI data in a fourth experiment (previously

Fig. 2. Decoding shared executive engagement during movie viewing in healthy participants. (A) Performance on the SART (Robertson et al., 1997) during simultaneous movie viewing.
The probability density function, to the right, shows that SART responses followed the canonical pattern (Robertson et al., 1997); i.e., responses preceding the erroneous key-press (where
responding was automatic; pink) were signiﬁcantly faster than those preceding the correct withhold (where executive processes were engaged; blue). (B/D) Overlay of the group-level frontoparietal IC (red) and the fronto-parietal activity (p b 0.05; FWE cor; green) predicted by SART performance (B)/frame ratings (D); overlap areas are displayed in yellow. (C) Middle panel:
group-averaged suspense ratings of movie stills. Top/bottom panels: (a–f) highest/(g–l) lowest rated frames. Higher rated frames predicted stronger activity within the fronto-parietal
network (D).
Taken from Naci et al. (2014).
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Fig. 3. Brain-wide inter-subject correlation of neural activity while listening to suspenseful
music. (A) The auditory-only presentation of music from “The Dark Knight” elicited significant (p b 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject correlation in the temporal lobe, bilaterally, but no
correlation was observed in any part of the frontal or parietal lobes. (B) Similar results to
(A) were observed during the auditory-only presentation of music from “Game of
Thrones.” Warmer colors depict higher t-values of inter-subject correlation.

unpublished; see Supplementary data). The ﬁlm soundtrack itself
contained both suspenseful music and speech crucial to the plot, and
thus, it was not possible to address this question directly in the movie
data. Instead, we did so in a more controlled manner by using independent fMRI data (N = 15) acquired during the auditory-only presentation of two suspenseful music pieces, from the movie “Dark Knight”
(4.5 min), and from the TV drama “Game of Thrones” (5 min). The presentation of suspenseful music, in the absence of any comprehension,
did not generate similar fronto-parietal activations across different individuals. Rather, for either music piece, signiﬁcant (p b 0.05; FWE cor)
inter-subject correlation was restricted to the auditory cortex (Figs. 3A
& B). Moreover, the formal comparison between an auditory-only
plot-driven short story (below; previously unpublished) and each
music piece showed signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) more intersubject correlation in the fronto-parietal regions for the story, suggesting that similar activations across participants in these regions reﬂected
the processing of the common narrative. These results lent further support to those of the movie study in suggesting that common executive
processes across different individuals, as indexed by the perception of
suspense, depend on comprehension of a common storyline.
It is worth noting that both the dual-task performance and the
suspense ratings are correlational measures and must be interpreted
with caution, as correlations between behavior and brain activity provide indirect evidence for the cognitive processes that drive behavior.
Nevertheless, as we argue above, these measures were motivated by a

A

conceptually and methodologically rigorous approach, and their convergent ﬁndings corroborated our hypothesis. Both these independent
measures explained activity in similar fronto-parietal networks that
were statistically similar to the one observed in the movie fMRI data,
as well as to the canonical executive network observed in a large number of neuroimaging studies (Yarkoni et al., 2011).
In summary, the results from the four experiments in healthy participants suggested that the movie's executive demands drove brain activity in frontal and parietal regions, and, further, that the correlation of
this activity across individuals underpinned their similar experience.
Each individual's fronto-parietal brain activity could be predicted from
the rest of the group's (Fig. 4), thus these data suggest that the frontoparietal activity represents a reliable neural index of the similarity of
his/her cognitive experience to the others'. This suggested that similar
conscious experiences in different individuals are supported by a common neural code.
Decoding conscious experience in behaviorally
non-responsive patients
In a subsequent study, we used this approach to examine and
quantify the movie watching experiences of two entirely behaviorally
non-responsive, severely brain-injured patients with unknown levels
of consciousness (Naci et al., 2014). Probing of brain function in individual brain-injured patients critically depended on the single-subject
level reliability of brain responses in healthy participants. A prior set
of leave-one-out analyses in healthy participants had shown that each
participant's auditory, visual, and fronto-parietal activities could be signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) predicted by the time-course of the corresponding activity in the rest of the group (Figs. 4A–C). The stereotyped
brain activity underlying similar executive function across individual
healthy participants enabled model-based predictions that could be applied to individual non-responsive patients.
FMRI data was acquired from the two patients, as they freely viewed
the Alfred Hitchcock movie. We reasoned that, if one of the patients engaged in executive processing while watching the movie, he would exhibit similar brain activity patterns in frontal and parietal regions to the
healthy participants. Conversely, we could use the healthy participants'
fronto-parietal activity as a benchmark for assessing the presence of
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Fig. 4. Predicting sensory-driven and higher-order processes during movie viewing in individual participants. (A–C) Single-subject SPM analyses probe individual participants' responses.
The processing of the movie's auditory (A), visual (B), and executive (C) information in each healthy participant was signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) predicted by the time-course of the
respective brain network in the leave-one-out group ICA. S1–S12 = Subject1–Subject12.
Taken from Naci et al. (2014).
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executive function, and, therefore, as an index of conscious experience,
in two clinically similar, behaviorally non-responsive patients.
Initially we assessed auditory and visual functions to test whether
the patients' sensory processing was similar to the healthy controls.
Subsequently the patients' executive function was evaluated. The
time-course of the auditory/visual/fronto-parietal network in the
healthy group was used as a regressor in the SPM model of each
patient's movie data. Patient 2 showed brain activity in auditory and visual cortices that was correlated to that of the healthy group (p b 0.05;
FWE cor) suggesting intact processing of both auditory and visual information in the movie (Fig. 5A). However, these responses cannot provide
evidence of conscious awareness, as stimulus selective responses are
observed in sensory regions in the absence of consciousness in anesthetized human (Macdonald et al., 2015) and nonhuman primates (Supèr
et al., 2001).
Importantly, activity in a network of frontal and parietal regions that
is known to support executive processing (Barbey et al., 2012; Ptak,
2011; Duncan, 2010; Sauseng et al., 2005; Hampshire and Owen,
2006) was signiﬁcantly correlated with that of healthy participants
(p b 0.05; FWE cor). To further test whether the frontal and parietal activations observed in Patient 2 truly reﬂected executive processes related to the movie plot, we assessed the extent to which it correlated with
the quantitative and qualitative measures of the movie's executive load.
Both of these measures, derived in healthy participants, signiﬁcantly
(p b 0.05; FWE cor) predicted the patient's activity in the same frontal
and parietal regions (Fig. 5). In summary, this patient demonstrated a
highly similar fronto-parietal brain response to that of the three independent groups of healthy participants. The patient's brain activity
in frontal and parietal regions was tightly correlated with the healthy
participants over time, and also, it reﬂected the executive demands of
speciﬁc events in the movie, as measured both qualitatively and quantitatively in healthy individuals (Figs. 5B & C).
These neuroimaging results were striking in light of the patient's enduring lack of behavioral responsivity observed in repeated assessments at his bedside over the 16-year period. However, they aligned
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with the patient's positive outcome in an independent commandfollowing task, the results of which were unknown at the time of the
movie experiment (Naci and Owen, 2013). However, it was impossible
to determine, based on the results of the command-following task and
the patient's behavioral assessments, whether he maintained conscious
experiences comparable to those of healthy individuals in response to
real-world events in his environment.
In the previous sections, we have argued that in the movie paradigm
the time-course of the correlated fronto-parietal activation pattern in
healthy individuals, or the evolution of its peaks and troughs over
time, is the code that represents at the neural level the cognitive experience of the movie's executive demands. This code does not read off
the precise details of a person's thoughts. Rather, it can reveal whether
two individuals have a highly similar cognitive experience when exposed to the same information. Thus, the time-course of the frontoparietal activation provides a template for decoding whether patients
who due to brain injury cannot provide self-report, have similar cognitive experiences to healthy individuals in response to the executive demands of the movie.
Therefore, the similarity of Patient 2's fronto-parietal activation to
that of healthy controls suggested that he experienced the movie similarly to the healthy individuals who watched it in the scanner. Importantly, the patient's fronto-parietal activation was highly sensitive to
the movie's executive load determined by a second group of controls
with a dual-task procedure outside of the scanner. This suggested speciﬁcally that the patient had a similar conscious response to the movie's
executive, demands as healthy individuals. An independent study corroborated this interpretation. Naci et al. (2015) found that the frontoparietal activity in response to naturalistic rich stimulation, such as
movies, was extinguished in deeply anesthetized unconscious individuals, further suggesting that the patient's brain responses in these regions could not be realized without the presence of covert conscious
awareness. Moreover, the patient's fronto-parietal activation was also
highly sensitive to the subjective experience of the movie's suspense,
determined by a third group of controls. This suggested speciﬁcally

Fig. 5. Decoding executive function in one behaviorally non-responsive patient. Healthy group: (A) group-level auditory (purple) and visual (blue) ICs. (B–C) The healthy group's activity
predicted by the quantitative (B)/qualitative (C) executive measure (green) is overlaid on the group fronto-parietal IC (red); overlap areas are displayed in yellow. Patient 1: (A) the
healthy group's auditory IC predicted signiﬁcant activity in Patient 1's auditory cortex (purple). (B–C) No evidence of visual responses, or executive processing similar to the healthy participants was observed. Patient 2: (A) the healthy group's auditory and visual ICs predicted signiﬁcant activity in Patient 2's auditory (purple) and visual (blue) cortex, respectively. (B–C)
The quantitative (B) and qualitative (C) executive measures predicted activity (green) in the patient's frontal and parietal regions. Overlap with activity predicted by the healthy group's
fronto-parietal IC (red) is displayed in yellow.
Taken from Naci et al. (2014).
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that the patient had a similar subjective perception of suspense during
the movie as healthy individuals. Sensitivity to the executively demanding and suspenseful moments of the movie depended on understanding
of the movie plot, which required a sophisticated cognitive repertoire,
including language understanding, working memory, reasoning capacities, and sustained attention.
Therefore, these data suggested not only that Patient 2 was
consciously aware, but also that he had preserved cognitive abilities
that enabled him to continuously engage in complex thoughts about
real-world events unfolding over time. In this context, these are likely
to include updating the contents of working memory (e.g., to follow
the plot), relating events in the movie to past experiences (e.g., to appreciate that a gun is a dangerous weapon), and coding the foreshadowing
cues (i.e., events that might have future relevance to the plot) characteristic of movies of this type (Naci et al., 2014).
Despite a highly similar clinical and behavioral proﬁle, Patient 1
showed no fMRI evidence of executive processing. This was consistent
with the lack of similarity between her visual response and that of
healthy controls (Figs. 5A–C). Independent fMRI analysis showed that
only a couple of isolated voxels in the patient's visual cortex responded
signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) to basic visual properties, such as the
visual contrast in the movie, suggesting that she retained very limited
visual processing. Moreover, as the visual activity of all individual
controls in the study showed a very high similarity [t(11) = 11.9; p b
0.00001] to one another, the lack of a comparable visual response in
the patient strongly suggested that she had highly impaired visual function. This further suggested not only that the patient did not adequately
process the movie's visual features, but also that consequently no audiovisual integration could take place, both of which were critical processing steps for understanding the ﬁlm.
In summary, the patient's data suggested that Patient 1 had
preserved auditory processing but highly impaired visual function,
consistent with inﬂuential studies showing impaired visual function
in a high proportion of patients with disorders of consciousness
(The Multi-Society Task Force, 1994). Therefore, these data highlighted
the need for developing auditory-only paradigms suitable for detecting
executive function in covertly aware patients. However, it is impossible
to determine based on these negative results, whether the patient was
truly unconscious, whether she was aware but could not understand
the movie due to impaired visual function, or whether she lacked complex visual function as well as conscious awareness. Moreover, negative
ﬁndings in non-responsive patients must be interpreted with caution
and cannot be used as conclusive evidence for lack of awareness, also
because false negative ﬁndings in functional neuroimaging studies
may sometime occur even in healthy volunteers, due to the normal variation in the signal to noise ratio of the BOLD measurement reﬂecting
the experimental manipulation. Nevertheless, the aforementioned
index of executive processing did reveal signiﬁcant and similar changes
in the fronto-parietal network in each and every healthy participant
who watched the movie, suggesting that its neural signature is reliably
present in all adult and conscious humans.
Caution must also be exercised when interpreting signiﬁcant
positive results that do align with a-priori predictions, as in the case of
Patient 2. Spurious results in patients can sometime result from neuroimaging analyses, such as for example, from the normalization of a
patient's native brain space to the healthy controls' template
(Beisteiner et al., 2010; Crinion et al., 2007; Brett et al., 2001). However,
the current approach did not involve normalization to a healthy template, nor did it constrain the patient's expected brain activity based
on the localization of the effect in healthy controls. Instead, the timecourse of brain activity in healthy controls served to build a strong prediction for the temporal evolution of brain activity in the patients, should
they retain covert awareness. The precise location of a patient's brain activity was expected to deviate from that of the healthy controls. Not only
is this naturally the case for individual healthy participants (e.g., Figs.
4A–C), but also, importantly, it is to be expected in brain-injured

patients as a result of structural and concomitant functional reorganization of the brain. Nevertheless, a spatial heuristic based on the
controls' data informed the interpretation of the patients' results, helping to infer the nature of the underlying residual brain function. In summary, drawing comparisons in the temporal domain enabled direct
relation of the healthy controls' activation to that of brain-injured patients, while avoiding stringent spatial constraints on the patients' functional anatomy.
In fMRI studies such as these, due to the absence of external cues, the
functional brain activity serves as the only indicator of the patient's mental states. Hence, it is especially important to achieve a high level of conﬁdence in the interpretation of brain activity, in order to avoid false
positives. In this study, converging results corroborated our interpretation of the brain activation observed in Patient 2. The Patient's residual
brain function was assessed hierarchically, from sensory (e.g., auditory,
visual) to higher order (e.g., executive) processes (Figs. 5A–C). As executive function in response to the movie depended on the integrity of more
basic cognitive processes, such as visual and auditory perception,
evidence for preserved structural and functional integrity along the cognitive hierarchy suggested that the patient was capable of integrated
thought. Moreover, when assessing further the integrity of the patient's
executive function, independent predictions from three independent
control groups were considered. Converging patient results from these
three independent tests provided strong evidence for the presence of
executive function and helped interpret the patient's ongoing conscious
experience during movie viewing.
Future directions
With the exception of the aforementioned study by Naci et al.
(2014), to date, neuroimaging studies that have probed consciousness
in behaviorally non-responsive patients have tested whether any
given patient could follow commands, and therefore demonstrate conscious awareness, via his/her brain activity (Naci and Owen, 2013;
Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013; Chennu et al., 2013; Cruse et al.,
2012; Bardin et al., 2012; Cruse et al., 2011; Bardin et al., 2011; Monti
et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2006; see Casali et al., 2013 for a different
approach). However, the requirement that a patient must be able to
produce brain responses as prescribed by study instructions, in order
to demonstrate that he/she is aware, is likely too stringent for many
patients who are aware, but, due to the effects of brain injury, fail
to comply with structured instructions (Chung et al., 2013; Giacino
et al., 2002; McDowell et al., 1997). The discrepancy between the
high proportion of non-responsive patients (~43%) who are routinely
misdiagnosed through bedside assessments (Schnakers et al., 2009)
and those who are able to demonstrate willful brain-based responses
(17–19%) (Cruse et al., 2011; Monti et al., 2010) suggests that
command-following neuroimaging techniques may lack the sensitivity
to detect conscious awareness in a subset of patients.
By contrast, the approach by Naci et al. (2014) is unconstrained
by any task commands, but, rather, captures attention naturally, and,
therefore, might be more effective for detecting conscious awareness.
Similar naturalistic paradigms in the auditory modality may be particularly suited to testing highly impaired patients with very limited
residual brain function, including chronic patients with absent visual
function and patients in coma. Coma is an acute state of unconsciousness occurring immediately after a brain injury, during which the patient exhibits no evidence of arousal or awareness. Comatose patients
are understood to be unarousably unconscious, do not open their eyes,
and only exhibit reﬂex responses to stimulation (Young, 2009). Some
coma patients go on to make a good recovery, while others progress
into vegetative or minimally conscious states. The ﬁrst days and
weeks following a serious brain injury are a time of considerable prognostic uncertainty, and this complicates decisions faced by health care
providers and families, including whether to continue or withdraw
life-sustaining therapies. While pilot studies in comatose patients have
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revealed residual cognitive function, no patient to date has demonstrated covert awareness through command following paradigms. Although
naturalistic paradigms have not yet been used to test comatose patients,
due to their low-effort nature, they are likely to be more effective for
identifying the subset of these patients, who remain aware, yet have
not recovered sufﬁcient cognitive resources to modulate their brain activity according to commands.
With this aim in mind, we have developed in healthy individuals an
auditory-only naturalistic paradigm for the assessment of executive
function in patients with impaired vision or eyes-closed comatose
patients (previously unpublished; see Supplementary data). fMRI data
was acquired from a group of healthy individuals (N = 15) as they listened to a short audio-story and a baseline version of the same auditory
stimulus. The audio-story (5 min) was an auditory excerpt from the
opening scene of the movie ‘Taken’. Similarly to the movie, in this
audio-story both speech and sound effects play a critical role in the development of its plot. The baseline stimulus was created by spectrally
rotating the frequencies in the intact stimulus in order to retain the
spectro-temporal characteristics of natural speech while rendering it
unintelligible.
When healthy participants (N = 15) listened to the audio-story in
the fMRI scanner, they displayed highly correlated (p b 0.05; FWE cor)
activity across the brain (Fig. 6A), including fronto-parietal regions,
known to support executive function (Barbey et al., 2012; Ptak, 2011;
Duncan, 2010; Hampshire and Owen, 2006; Sauseng et al., 2005). By
contrast, signiﬁcant (p b 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject correlation during
the baseline was restricted to the auditory cortex, and a small cluster in
right inferior prefrontal cortex (Fig. 6B). Formal comparison between
the intact and baseline stimulus revealed that the intact story elicited
signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) more inter-subject correlation than
the baseline bilaterally, in parietal, temporal, motor, and dorsal/ventral
frontal/prefrontal cortex (Fig. 6C). These results conﬁrmed that the
inter-subject correlation elicited by the story in high-order supramodal
regions could not merely reﬂect modulations in the feed-forward processing load imposed by variations in the auditory information, nor
any automatic attention effects triggered by the similarity of auditory
stimuli across participants.
To relate the correlated activity ﬂuctuations to different and speciﬁc
aspects of the audio-story experience we used tensor independent component analysis (ICA) (Calhoun et al., 2009; Beckmann and Smith, 2005,
2004). Group ICA revealed spatially distinct networks in sensory speciﬁc
(i.e., visual, auditory, motor) cortex, and regions of the frontal and parietal lobes. To further conﬁrm that this fronto-parietal network reﬂected
correlated activity across different participants, we performed singlesubject ICAs (Bartels and Zeki, 2004; Bartels and Zeki, 2005; Bartels
et al., 2008), which revealed a high correlation between the singlesubject time-courses for the fronto-parietal component [t(14) =
11.82, p b 0.001; Fig. 7]. The slightly lower inter-subject correlation in
the fronto-parietal as compared to auditory regions [t(14) = 16.94,
p b 0.001] was consistent with a previous fMRI study showing that
during naturalistic stimulation individual time courses were highly consistent in sensory projection cortices and more variable elsewhere
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(Malinen et al., 2007). By contrast, single-subject time-courses were
not correlated during the baseline stimuli, conﬁrming that the processing of higher-level properties of the audio-story, including its narrative,
must be driving the correlated activity in these regions across participants. Future studies will specify how the executive demands of the
audio-story drive these fronto-parietal activity patterns.
Subsequently, we determined whether this audio-story paradigm
was suitable for generating reliable prediction at the individual level,
which would suggest that it might be useful for testing individual
patients in future applications. A set of leave-one-out analyses showed
that 15/15 participants' auditory and 14/15 participants' frontoparietal activity could be signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) predicted
by the time-course of the corresponding activity in the rest of the
group (Figs. 8A & B). These data suggested that the audio-story elicits
common executive processes in individual healthy controls that can
be used to probe executive function in individual patients.
In summary, like the movie paradigm, this auditory paradigm is easy
to administer, brief, and does not require compliance with task instructions. Rather, it engages attention naturally through meaningful sounds
and speech that are similar to the real-world auditory information in a
patient's environment. This approach is highly suited to a proportion
of brain-injured behaviorally non-responsive patients who have lost visual, but retain auditory function (The Multi-Society Task Force, 1994).
Discussion
Decoding the contents of consciousness in behaviorally nonresponsive patients poses unique challenges. Until recently, patient
studies have used structured instructions to elicit willful modulation
of brain activity according to command, in order to decode the presence
of willful brain-based responses in this patient group. These studies
have shown that despite the apparent absence of external signs of
consciousness, a signiﬁcant minority patients with disorders of consciousness can respond to commands by wilfully modulating their
brain activity (Naci and Owen, 2013; Fernández-Espejo and Owen,
2013; Cruse et al., 2012; Cruse et al., 2011; Monti et al., 2010; Owen
et al., 2006), and even respond to ‘yes’/‘no’ questions, by performing
mental tasks (Naci and Owen, 2013; Fernández-Espejo and Owen,
2013; Monti et al., 2010). However, the extent of preserved mental life
in any such responsive patient remained unknown.
In previous work (Naci et al., 2014), we have used multisensory
naturalistic paradigms, such as free viewing of an audio-visual movie,
to demonstrate that a common neural code supports conscious experiences in different individuals, and moreover, that this code may be used
to interpret conscious experiences. In this study, the term ‘neural code’
refers to a system that allows us to decode, or to recognize and interpret,
the cognitive experiences of different individuals, and thus it may decipher information about an individual's cognitive experience that would
otherwise be inaccessible in the absence of self-report, as is the case for
behaviorally non-responsive patients. Unlike previous methods (Naci
et al., 2013; Soon et al., 2008; Kamitani and Tong, 2005) that have
used behavioral states to determine how brain activity underlies

L R

0 1 2 3 4

C

1 2 3 4 5

Fig. 6. Brain-wide inter-subject correlation of neural activity while listening to the audio-story and auditory baseline. (A) The audio-story elicited signiﬁcant (p b 0.05; FWE cor) intersubject correlation across the brain, including frontal and parietal cortices, thought to support executive function. (B) The baseline elicited signiﬁcant (p b 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject
correlation within primary and association auditory cortices. A small cluster was also observed in the right inferior prefrontal cortex. None was observed in dorsal prefrontal and parietal
cortices. (C) The audio-story elicited signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) more inter-subject correlation than the auditory baseline derived from the same stimulus, in parietal, temporal,
motor, and dorsal/ventral frontal/prefrontal cortices. Warmer colors depict higher t-values of inter-subject correlation.
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Fig. 7. Inter-subject correlation of neural activity within different functional brain networks. Time-courses of group-level ICA components (ICs) clustered into ﬁve spatially distinct brain
networks, displayed in different colors on top of each bar. Each bar represents the group-averaged individual time-courses for each IC derived by single-subject ICAs. The single-subject
time-courses of the auditory (purple) and fronto-parietal (green) ICs were signiﬁcantly correlated across individuals.

conscious states in healthy individuals, this approach interprets brain
activity, and concomitant mental states, without recourse to an
individual's behavior. Thus, it is uniquely suited to investigating conscious experience in individuals whose status as conscious agents is uncertain and cannot be tested through behavior or introspective report.
When applied to patients with unknown levels of consciousness, this
approach provided strong evidence that one patient, who had remained
non-responsive for 16 years, was consciously aware and could continuously engage in complex thoughts about real-world events unfolding
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over time. Future patient cohort studies are necessary in order to establish the clinical prevalence of such highly preserved levels of awareness
in this patient group.
For the purpose of clinical diagnosis, consciousness is deﬁned
as awareness of oneself and the environment as demonstrated through
behavioral command-following (The Multi-Society Task Force, 1994).
However, for a large proportion (~43%) of patients, behavioral testing
lacks sufﬁcient sensitivity, leading to an incorrect diagnosis (Schnakers
et al., 2009; Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993). This article presents
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Fig. 8. Predicting sensory-driven and higher-order processes during the audio-story in individual participants. Single-subject SPM analyses probed individual participants' responses. The
processing of the movie's auditory (A), and executive (B) information in each healthy participant was signiﬁcantly (p b 0.05; FWE cor) predicted by the time-course of the respective brain
network in the leave-one-out group ICA. S1–S15 = Subject1–Subject15.
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a novel approach that uses brain activity as a proxy for behavior, speciﬁcally to assess the dimension of consciousness that relates to an
individual's awareness of the environment.
When the healthy controls' subjective experience of the movie's suspenseful features was assessed moment-by-moment (every two seconds), we found that their perception of suspense was very similar to
one another, mirroring their highly correlated brain responses (Naci
et al., 2014). Similarly to each healthy individual, the brain response of
Patient 2 tracked the control's perception of suspense, thus showing
speciﬁc sensitivity to environmental features on an ongoing and temporally precise basis, consistent with a previous EEG study in healthy controls (Dmochowski et al., 2012). Therefore, these results suggested that
the conscious perception of some brain-injured non-responsive patients can track that of healthy individuals at a remarkably speciﬁc
time-scale, as events in their environment unfold moment-by-moment.
New experimental ﬁndings extended the results of the audio-visual
paradigm to auditory-only naturalistic conditions, such as unconstrained listening to an audio-story. Using this paradigm, it may be possible to identify comatose patients who exhibit clear neural signs of
executive function, and therefore awareness, at a time when they are
thought to be unconscious. Further, by testing patients longitudinally
from the initial moments post injury to recovery, and comparing the
residual cognitive proﬁle of those patients who improve with those
who deteriorate, we may identify objective prognostic markers that
will improve treatment decisions and patient care in crucial early stages
of brain injury.
Conclusions
These naturalistic paradigms may be suitable for investigating how
brain function tracks clinical progression in other patient groups, such
as those with psychiatric conditions. The ease of administration and
patient engagement makes them advantageous for patient testing
over conventional paradigms. Moreover, they can be advantageous on
account of the widespread neural recruitment they elicit across the
brain. An fMRI study found that ‘rich’ stimulation, such as free viewing
of a movie, lead to stimulus-speciﬁc activation in more areas than
with conventional stimuli (Bartels and Zeki, 2004). Therefore these
naturalistic conditions may be uniquely suited to investigating how the
interrelation between a number of brain systems, including sensorydriven (auditory, visual) and higher order (e.g., executive), leads to atypical behavior.
A previous study (Hasson et al., 2009) looked at fMRI responses
across the entire cortex in adults with autism during free viewing of a
popular audio-visual movie. It found that the neural activity of individuals with autism was characterized by idiosyncratic responses that were
both highly variable across autistic individuals, and different from the
responses observed within the matched controls. Future studies are
needed to investigate whether these idiosyncratic responses reﬂect
functionally distinct contributions and what the underlying brain mechanism might be. The study also found that, within each autistic individual, responses across repeated presentations of the same movie were
unique and reliably replicable (Hasson et al., 2009). Thus, repeated testing with the same naturalistic stimuli might provide a window into
whether altered perceptions are erratic or consistent and speciﬁc to certain individual patients or patient groups. When consistent responses to
natural conditions are observed for individual patients, testing these individuals at different clinical time-points might further help to track
changes or preservation of a patient's condition. In these cases, it must
be considered that signiﬁcant reductions in neural correlation may
occur naturally upon repeated exposures to the same naturalistic stimulus (Dmochowski et al., 2012).
Finally, future studies will advance the methodology for accurately
classifying healthy and disordered function in cases where the differences in the BOLD measurement between clinical groups and controls,
but also within a clinical group, are nuanced and subtler as compared
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to the all or none responses reported to date for severely brain-injured
patients with disorders of consciousness.
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